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Abstract. A number of theories (search and eciency wages)
have been developed, in part, to explain why identically able work-
ers are often paid dierent wages. However, when there is a mini-
mum wage, they do not explain the resulting \spike" in the wage
distribution. Our model's predictions are consistent with this evi-
dence. We assume that workers are equally able but have hetero-
geneous preferences for non-wage characteristics, while employers
have heterogeneous productivity characteristics. This results in a
model of labor market oligopsony where \inside" and \outside"
forces interact, producing wage dispersion as well as a spike at the
minimum wage.
JEL classication numbers: J23, J42, L13
Keywords: wage dierentials, wage dispersion, monopsony, oligop-
sony, labor theory, minimum wage.
Date: February 1999.
We thank George Deltas, Eric Friedman, Phil Trostel and seminar participants at
Rutgers University, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale and the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for useful comments and suggestions. We are espe-
cially grateful to Andrew Oswald for his careful reading and insightful observations
and Martin Cripps for suggesting an elegant method of proof for Proposition 1.1. Introduction
The empirical evidence on the structure of wages presents a serious
challenge to the competitive theory of labor markets, where workers are
paid their marginal products. Competitive theory predicts that wage
rates should depend only on workers' abilities. This is in stark con-
trast to the empirical evidence, which nds large inter-industry wage
dierentials for workers with identical characteristics.1 Even within in-
dustries, there is evidence that wages vary signicantly (Dunlop, 1957;
Groshen, 1991). There is also evidence that large establishments tend
to pay substantial wage premiums (Brown and Medo, 1989). More-
over, the eect on the wage distribution of an increase in the minimum
wage reinforces these puzzles|rather than simply truncating the wage
distribution, such a hike often raises wages, for minimum wage work-
ers as well as those who are paid more than the minimum wage (Card
and Krueger, 1995; Dolado et al., 1997; Grossman, 1983). Further, a
minimum wage produces a \spike" in the distribution of wages (Card
and Krueger, 1995). While modications of competitive theory can
produce wage dispersion (e.g., sorting and compensating dierentials),
these modications are limited in their explanatory power (see Katz
(1986) and Krueger and Summers (1987) for surveys).
In response to this empirical evidence, a number of non-competitive
theories have been developed. The leading examples are eciency wage
theory (Albrecht and Vroman, 1998; Bulow and Summers, 1986; Ra-
maswamy and Rowthorn, 1991; Stiglitz, 1985) and job search models
(Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). We present an alternative model of
the labor market whose predictions are consistent with the empirical
evidence on the distribution of wages. Our model's key predictions are
two-fold. First, workers of identical ability are paid dierent wages by
dierent employers and the resulting distribution of wages is consistent
with the observed wage distributions. Second, the imposition of a min-
imum wage raises the wages of minimum wage workers, has a spillover
eect on the wages of higher-paid workers while compressing the wage
distribution. Finally, our model also predicts the occurrence of a spike
in the wage distribution at the minimum wage, the presence of which
is contrary to the above models. Apart from its explanatory power, a
key feature of our model is its tractability and simplicity, which makes
it amenable for empirical analysis. We believe that our model provides
1Slichter (1950) was an early attempt to quantify the degree of wage dispersion
and subsequently there have been numerous contributions. See for example Black-
burn and Neumark (1992); Dickens and Katz (1987b); Gibbons and Katz (1992);
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an alternative explanation for these empirical facts, which is, in some
ways more persuasive|a comparison of the relative merits of these
theories is deferred to Section 4, until we develop our theory and its
implications.
Our model relies on two key assumptions. The rst is that workers
with identical skills and abilities have heterogeneous preferences over
non-wage characteristics of employers (Bhaskar and To, 1998; Boal and
Ransom, 1997). These include the actual job specication, hours of
work, distance of the rm from the worker's home, the social environ-
ment in the workplace, etc. The importance of non-wage character-
istics has been recognized in the theory of compensating dierentials,
which is a theory of vertical dierentiation. Some jobs are good while
other jobs are bad, and wage dierentials compensate workers for these
dierences in characteristics. Our approach is one of horizontal job
dierentiation|we assume that dierent workers have dierent pref-
erences over non-wage characteristics.2 As long as the number of em-
ployers is nite, heterogeneous non-wage preferences ensure that wage
setting employers have wage setting power. That is, we have what
is classically referred to as oligopsony. The literature on oligopsony
is sparse, consisting primarily of empirical evaluations of oligopsony
power (Boal and Ransom, 1997, p. 91).3
The second important assumption is that the marginal product of
labor varies between employers|note that this is well consistent with
the average product of labor or protability being the same across
rms. Indeed, such heterogeneity is unavoidable if rms from dierent
product markets compete in the same labor market. Given employer
wage setting power, heterogeneity in their productive characteristics
results in an equilibrium with dispersion in wages.
Our main results are as follows. Firms oer dierent wages in equi-
librium with \high productivity" rms typically oering higher wages.
Firms that oer high wages employ more workers and also tend to be
more protable. Finally, under a minimum wage, rms not directly
aected by the minimum also raise their wages and a minimum wage
introduces a spike in the wage distribution.
2McCue and Reed (1996) provide survey evidence of horizontal heterogeneity in
worker preferences.
3Surprisingly, the early theoretical work on oligopsony appeared only recently
in the agricultural economics literature (Chen and Lent, 1992). More recent the-
oretical treatments include Hamilton et al. (1998), Kaas and Madden (1999) and
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2. The Model
We now present our model of an imperfectly competitive labor mar-
ket. Its central feature is that jobs dier in terms of their non-wage
characteristics and employers dier in characteristics which aect the
marginal revenue product of labor. To model horizontal dierentiation
in a simple and tractable way, we adapt the inuential model of Salop
(1979b). We assume that the job characteristic space is a circle of unit
circumference (as in Figure 1). Workers of equal ability are uniformly
distributed along all points of the circumference. Let there be n rms
in the market. Following Salop, we do not model the location choices
of rms, but assume that these rms are uniformly spaced around the
circle.4 In Figure 1 rms are located at points marked with an H or an
L (ignore for the moment the particular interpretation associated with
H and L). A worker who travels distance d to work in a rm incurs
a transportation cost of td (i.e., this cost is linear in distance, and t is
the unit transportation cost). In evaluating wage oers at two rms,
a worker takes into account the wages oered as well as the transport
cost incurred in working at each of these rms. Workers at dierent lo-
cations will evaluate job oers dierently, since they will have dierent
transport costs associated with work at any rm.
We allow for a diversity of workers' reservation wages, in the simplest
possible way, by assuming that there is a unit mass of low reservation
wage workers who are uniformly distributed along the circle, and a
mass  of high reservation wage workers who are similarly uniformly
distributed. For simplicity we set the former's reservation wage to
zero, and assume that the latter's reservation wage is v > 0. Our basic
results extend to the general case where we have any arbitrarily large
nite set of types of workers at each location.
A worker will choose to work as long as the wage less their transporta-
tion cost is at least their reservation wage. Our focus is on parameter
values where, in equilibrium, all low reservation wage workers work and
only some high reservation wage workers work. This ensures that there
is competition for workers between rms and that total employment
can vary.
4While job characteristics may be, to a large extent, exogenously determined
(type of work, physical location, etc.), employers may be able to aect other char-
acteristics (management style, the physical environment of the workplace, etc.)
If we make the extreme assumption that all job characteristics are endogenously
determined then employers will choose their job characteristics prior to choosing
wages and equilibrium locations will be, as we have assumed, uniform about the








Figure 1. Example with n = 8
Alternating Firm Types
2.1. Labor Supply. We consider a model of oligopsony where there
is no free entry or exit so that the number of rms, n, is xed. Some of
the implications of allowing rm entry and exit are explored in Bhaskar
and To (1998).
With n rms in the market, the distance between rms is 1=n. Sup-
pose that rm i oers wage wi and one of rm i's nearest rivals, j,
is oering wage wj. Consider a low reservation wage worker who is
located between rms i and j at distance x from i and 1=n   x from
j. Such a worker will work for rm i if wi  tx > wj  t(1=n  x), and
will work for i's rival if this inequality is reversed. A worker located at
a distance x0 2 (0;1=n) is indierent between working for rm i and
i's closest neighbor when:
wi   tx
0 = wj   t(1=n   x
0):
Solving for x0 we see that x0 = (t=n + wi   wj)=2t, provided that
jwi   wjj  t=n. Since all workers located up to a distance of x0
from rm i have lower transportation costs they will work for rm i.
Similarly, all workers located farther than x0 from rm i have higher
transportation costs and will work for i's rival. Since there is a similar
set of workers on the other side of rm i, rm i's supply of 0-reservation
wage workers is
t=n + wi    wi
t
where  wi is the mean wage oered by i's two nearest neighbors.OLIGOPSONY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES 5
Consider now the supply of high reservation wage workers. A high
reservation wage worker located at x will not work at all if wi  tx < v
but will work for rm i if wi tx > v. Let xv 2 (0;1=n) be the distance
at which a high reservation wage worker is indierent between working






provided that wi  v. Again, all workers located between rm i and xv
work for rm i and those located farther than xv do not work. Hence
rm i's supply of v-reservation wage workers is 2xv.
Therefore, when jwi   wjj  1=n and wi  v, rm i's total labor
supply is:
Li =
t=n   2v + (1 + 2)wi    wi
t
: (1)
Equation (1) shows that labor supply is increasing in the rm's own
wage, wi, but decreasing in the wages paid by other rms,  wi.5 How-
ever, due to variations in the participation rate (due to the presence
of high reservation wage workers), the former eect is larger than the
latter, so that a unit increase in both wi and  wi leads to increased labor
supply for rm i. This also implies that the elasticity of labor supply for
the individual rm exceeds the elasticity of industry labor supply. Thus
the situation diers from both monopsony and perfect competition|
under monopsony there is no distinction between the two elasticities
and under perfect competition, labor supply is innitely elastic at the
level of the rm.
2.2. Firm Prot Maximization. We now turn to the rm's output
decisions, which aect labor demand. Firm i's output is given by the
homogeneous of degree one production function:
Yi = Lifi(Ki=Li) (2)
where Ki is i's capital input and fi is assumed to be twice dieren-
tiable, increasing and concave, so that f00
i < 0. Since dierent workers
have identical skills and abilities, they enter the production function
uniformly.
Firm i's prots can be written as follows:
i = piLifi(Ki=Li)   rKi   wiLi: (3)
5That is, one rm's wage setting decision has an externality eect on other rms'
labor supply. This externality will have an important eect on the equilibrium wage
distribution.6 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
where pi is the price of rm i's output and r is the capital rental rate.
Product prices may dier due to product dierentiation or because
rms competing within the same labor market may be selling dierent
goods.
Firm i's rst order condition with respect to Ki is
pif
0
i(ki)   r = 0 (4)
where ki = Ki=Li is the capital-labor ratio. This implies that in equilib-
rium, the capital-labor ratio is a function of r=pi only, and is therefore
constant if r and pi are xed. Furthermore, given the assumption of
concavity, an increase in the market price or a fall in the capital rental
rate results in an increase in the capital labor ratio.
Using (4) we see that prots (3) can be rewritten as
i = i(pi;r)Li   wiLi (5)
where i(pi;r) = pi[fi(ki(r=pi))   f0
i(ki(r=pi))ki(r=pi)]. We call i rm
i's net revenue product of labor which diers from its marginal revenue
product in that rm i is optimally adjusting its capital labor ratio.
The rst order condition with respect to the wage for rm i is
@i
@wi





(1 + 2)i   t=n + 2v +  wi   2(1 + 2)wi
t
= 0:
This rst order condition yields the rm's optimal wage as a function
of the mean wage set by its nearest rivals:
wi = i +   wi (6)
where
i =






Observe that the individual rm's optimal wage, wi, is an increasing
function of the wage set by other rms,  wi. For example, in Figure
2, if i's nearest rivals oer a mean wage of  wi, i's optimal wage is wi.
However, if i's rivals raise their mean wage to  w0
i, i must similarly raise
its wage to w0
i in order to continue maximizing prots. This implies
that we have a situation of strategic complementarity in wage setting.
As we shall see later, this has important implications for the eects of

















































Figure 2. Wage Setting Oligopsonists
above the minimum wage, and would therefore seem to be unaected
by such legislation.
Equations similar to (6) have been popular in some recent empiri-
cal work in labor economics (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchower
et al., 1996; Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990, for example). This litera-
ture estimates a wage equation where the wage depends upon \inside"
factors such as rm protability and upon the outside wage  w. Our
theoretical wage equation has a similar form, since i captures the
inside factors while  is the coecient upon the outside wage. Note
however that the theoretical model says that the outside wage is rm-
specic, i.e.,  wi. Hence, to re-interpret these wage equation estimates,
this implies that the outside wage in such empirical work is subject
to measurement error. In particular, the estimated coecient on the
outside wage will be biased downward. Moreover, this also implies that
the estimate of the role of inside factors in such empirical work will also
be biased. The biases of insider factors will have the further problem
that both the direction and the magnitude of these biases are unknown.
In other words, our model suggests that one should be careful in prox-
ying the outside wage, especially for rms which operate in a spatially
separated environment.
Now returning to solving the model, a Nash equilibrium is given
by the simultaneous solution to (6) for i = 0;:::n   1. This can be8 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
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After solving for B 1, we show that each employer's equilibrium wage
is a positive weighted sum of all j's where the impact of rival j on rm
i's wage declines in j's distance from i. Furthermore, i's own i has
the greatest weight. This suggests that, although it need not be the
case (see p. 15), high productivity rms will typically oer high wages
and low productivity rms will typically oer low wages. It should now
be apparent that as long as i 6= j for some i and j, we will have a
dispersed wage equilibrium.
Dene [] to be the greatest integer function (i.e., [x] = maxfi 2 I j
i  xg). The above results, stated more formally,




qj = qn j for j = 1;:::[n=2] and q0 > q1 > ::: > q[n=2] > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to better understand the properties of our dispersed wage
equilibrium, we now restrict ourselves to a few simple, symmetric ex-
amples. One particularly simple example is when i = j for i 6= j. In






















Using slightly more complicated symmetric examples, we now explore
the implications of oligopsony in more detail.
3. Wage Dispersion
In order to have wage dispersion, we must have rms diering in
some respect. We choose to model this by assuming that some rms
are of type H, having high net revenue product, H, while others are
of type L, having low net revenue product, L. These dierences inOLIGOPSONY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES 9
net revenue product can be for a number of reasons. For example,
if rms in this labor market are in dierent industries then product
prices and production functions will dier, giving rise to dierences in
net revenue product. On the other hand, rms within the same product
market may have dierent production functions because of rm specic
characteristics such as, diering managerial talent, dierent production
techniques, dierent access to assets with varying productivities (fertile
vs infertile land), etc.6 As we will see, this implies that on average,
higher productivity rms will pay higher wages than lower productivity
rms. However, the extent of wage dispersion depends upon the extent
to which the two types of rms compete for workers. To examine this
eect we consider two types of interaction.
To start with, consider a model where high productivity rms only
compete with low productivity rms for workers. Let there be an even
number of rms n, of which n=2 are of type H, having high productivity,
and n=2 are of type L, with low productivity. We assume that the
n rms are evenly spaced along the circle, and the types alternate in
location, as in Figure 1. This implies that a high type rm's immediate











1   2 (11)









(H   L)(1 + 2)
3 + 4
(12)
We illustrate the optimal wages of both types of rms in Figure 3.
Equilibrium wages are given by the intersection of the two reaction
functions|this intersection is above the 45 line, reecting the higher
wages paid by the more productive rms. Accordingly, employment
is higher in the high productivity rms than in the low productivity
rms with the more productive rms employing more of both types of
workers.
Alternatively, assume that n is divisible by four and consider the
location pattern depicted in Figure 4, where rms are evenly spaced,
6Dierences in worker productivities does not necessarily drive out rms that
are less productive. As it is commonly argued|even with a perfectly competitive
product market|assets which lead to higher productivities will command a higher


























































Figure 4. Alternating pairs of rm types
and we have two H type rms, followed by two L type rms, followed
by two H type rms, and so on. In this conguration each rm has one
L type neighbor and one H type neighbor. Equilibrium wages, and theOLIGOPSONY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES 11

















L = H   L (15)
The wage dierential in this case is higher than the case with alternat-
ing locations. Clearly, the magnitude of wage dierentials depend on
the degree to which high and low productivity rms interact and we
conjecture that the greater the degree of interaction, the smaller the
dierential.
Since rms in dierent industries have dierent production tech-
niques and face dierent prices, their net revenue products will dier
(i.e., H > L). Thus these results are consistent with inter-industry
wage dierentials. Furthermore, rms within the same industry can
have dierent production functions, and as a result dierent productivi-
ties. Thus our results are consistent with the existence of intra-industry
wage dierentials. To the extent that prices and production techniques
are likely to be more similar within an industry, we expect that mea-
sured intra-industry wage dierentials should typically be smaller than
measured inter-industry wage dierentials. Finally, notice that these
wage dierentials can be quite large. With our rst example, the mag-
nitude of the wage dierential ranges from a sixth to a quarter of the
dierence in employer productivity while with the latter example the
wage dierential is equal to a half this dierence.
Similarly, for each of these examples, we can compute the size dier-
























Thus employers that oer higher wages employ more workers. That is,
the \employer size{wage eect" (Brown and Medo, 1989) arises natu-
rally in this model. Furthermore, Dickens and Katz (1987a) found that
industries which paid well in one occupation also tended to pay highly
in other occupations. Suppose that an industry's marginal revenue
products are correlated over the occupations it employs. For example,
it would be unusual for a high tech computer manufacturer to provide12 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
its secretaries with manual typewriters rather than modern comput-
ers and software whereas in a small corner shop, although unusual, it
might not be that surprising. If marginal revenue products are corre-
lated within an industry we would nd that industries which tend to
pay high wages for one occupation also tend to pay high wages in other
occupations. That is, a high wage rm is likely to have high marginal
revenue products for all occupations that it hires and as a result it will
oer higher wages than its rivals.
3.1. Protability and Wages. There is also evidence that rms that
are more protable tend to oer higher wages (Blanchower et al., 1996;
Dickens and Katz, 1987a; Pugel, 1980). However, as we argued earlier
(footnote 6), assets which increase worker productivity will command
a higher price. Thus in order to draw any conclusions in this direction
requires more than the heterogeneity which we've assumed. One possi-
bility is that there is a xed cost of production, ci, which is correlated
with the marginal revenue product of labor. For illustrative purposes,
suppose that this correlation is perfect and that ci = i. In this case,
prots can be rewritten as:
i = i(Li   )   wiLi (18)
Although it is not necessarily true that that high productivity rms
oer higher wages (see page 15), it will be true on average. In this case,
higher productivity employers will typically earn higher prots and pay
higher wages. Note that even though the correlation between ci and
i is perfect, the correlation between i and wi will be imperfect and
depends on how employers are distributed in relation to one another.
Alternatively we could assume that there is rent sharing between
rms and the owners of scarce resources used in production. The Nash
bargaining solution would predict that ci = (i   w
i)L
i where  is
the resource owner's \bargaining power." In this case, prots can be
rewritten as 
i = (1   )(i   w
i)L
i. Provided that the owners of
these resources do not hold all of the bargaining power and bargain-
ing powers are similar across these owners, our model would predict
a positive relationship between rm protability and wages. This is
particularly interesting because the existence of rents can have eects
even for employees who do not share in the rents.
In sum, once we include fairly reasonable assumptions regarding the
xed cost of production, our model can explain the observed correlation
between protability and wages. The degree of correlation depends
on the nature of interaction between employers and on the degree of
correlation between productivity and xed production costs.OLIGOPSONY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES 13
3.2. The Eect of Minimum Wages on the Distribution of
Wages. We now consider the eect of minimum wages on the dis-
tribution of wages. Empirical work on minimum wages has noted that
minimum wages tend to reduce wage dispersion, and can also cause a
\spike" in the wage distribution at the minimum wage. We examine
the eects of minimum wages upon wage dispersion and upon rms
who pay more than the minimum.
In the case where high and low productivity rms alternate in loca-
tion (as in Figure 1), consider the eect of a minimum wage, starting
at w
L, the equilibrium wage of the less productive rms. An increase
in the minimum wage above w
L aects the wage paid by the less pro-
ductive rms one-for-one. The eect on wages paid by the high type
rms is given by their reaction function, as long as this wage is above
the minimum (Figure 3). Thus although the minimum wage is not
binding on the high wage rms, there is a spillover eect which is due
to the strategic complementarity in wage setting. Finally, at the point
~ w, where the reaction function intersects the 45 line, the minimum
wage becomes binding for the high productivity rms as well and they
also start paying exactly the minimum wage.
Consider the implications of our analysis for wage dispersion. A
minimum wage reduces wage dispersion, but to a smaller extent than
if there were no interaction, since wages also rise in the high wage rms.
Note that the dierence between the wages paid by the two types of
rms at any minimum wage is given by the vertical distance between
the high productivity rm's reaction function and the 45 line. This
declines with the minimum wage, and nally shrinks to zero at ~ w.
Now consider again the conguration as illustrated in Figure 4. The
wage of the high productivity rms, as a function of the wage of low








Hence a minimum wage which binds only on low wage rms raises the
wages of high productive rms by a factor =(2   ). This eect is
positive, but less than the eect in the case of alternating rms since
 < 1. Indeed, one can show that high wage rms here are hurt less
than in the former case.
These examples show that when high wage rms interact directly
with only low wage rms, there is less wage dispersion and a minimum








Figure 5. One H rm alternating with 3 L rms
with both low wage and high wage rms, there is greater wage dis-
persion and a minimum wage compresses this dispersion at a slower
rate.
To see how a spike in the wage distribution arises in our model,
consider yet a third conguration. Suppose again that n is divisible
by four but rms are located following a pattern like that in Figure 5
where three type L rms are followed by one type H rm, followed by
three type L rms, etc. In this conguration, L  rms have two L type
neighbors, L+ rms have one L type neighbor and one H type neighbor
and H rms have two L type neighbors. The equilibrium wages in this
case are:
wH =












2L + 2L + 2(H   L)
2(1   2)
: (21)




L > 0. Thus the equilibrium wage
distribution has 1/4 of all rms paying wH, 1/2 of all rms paying w
+
L
and 1/4 of all rms paying w
 
L. Note that even though L+ and L  em-
ployers have identical net revenue products of labor, they oer dierent
equilibrium wages. This is a result of the fact that L+ rms are com-
peting with both H and L type rms but L  rms are only competingOLIGOPSONY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES 15
with L type rms. It should be apparent from this example that even
with just two types of employers, more arbitrary location patterns will
generate fairly complicated equilibrium wage distributions.
If we introduce a minimum wage which is binding on all of the L type
rms but not binding on the H type rms (i.e., wm  (2L+H)=(2 
  2) but wm < H=(1 )) then 3/4 of all rms will be paying the
minimum and 1/4 of all rms will be paying more than the minimum.
In other words, there is now a spike in the wage distribution at the
minimum. More generally with arbitrary n and i's, the equilibrium
will result in some nite set of wages (as many as but no more than
n). A minimum wage will be binding on those employers oering the
lowest wages and will have a spillover eect on those oering higher
wages.
As a brief aside, note that with many types, one might conjecture
that there is a monotonic relationship between net revenue product,
i, and the equilibrium wage, wi. This intuition is incorrect as can be
easily demonstrated. Suppose there are 3 productivity levels, L, M
and H, and four employers. Suppose that rms 0 and 3 are of type L
and H and that both rms 1 and 2 are of type M. Let M = L+.
When  is small, equilibrium wages will be close to those from the
previous example with n = 4, implying that w3 > w2 even though
2 > 3.
4. Alternative Theories
We now compare our modeling approach to alternative non-perfectly
competitive models of the distribution of wages.
Eciency wage theory has been oered as one explanation for wage
dispersion. Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1991) consider an eciency
wage model where rms have heterogeneous production functions, and
assume that eort in each rm is a function of the wage|the micro-
foundations behind this eort decision are not specied. Each rm
sets the wage to satisfy a generalized Solow condition and this gives
rise to wage dispersion. Since eort does not depend upon outside
wages, there are no spillover eects, and hence minimum wages would
not aect high wage rms. For the same reason, this model can also
accommodate a spike in the wage distribution caused by a minimum
wage.
Albrecht and Vroman (1998) consider an eciency wage model with
homogeneous rms where workers dier in their disutility of eort, so
that there is adverse selection in addition to moral hazard. For any
given wage, the set of employees of the rm is partitioned into shirkers
(those with a relatively high disutility of eort) and non-shirkers. When16 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
there is a continuous wage distribution, rms face a smooth trade-o,
where a higher wage reduces the set of shirkers, and increases aggre-
gate eort. When the wage distribution has a mass point, however, a
rm at the mass point has an incentive to oer a slightly higher wage
because by doing so it can discontinuously increase the proportion of
non-shirkers amongst its new hires. This is because with a mass point,
the distribution of unemployed workers is discontinuous and workers
with a high disutility of eort are overrepresented. Thus the equi-
librium in this model must not only involve wage dispersion but the
distribution of wages must be atomless. As a result, there cannot be a
spike in the wage distribution.7
An alternative approach is the literature on job search. Workers must
search in order to know about wage oers, and this gives employers
market power. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) analyze wage dispersion
in a model with a xed number of rms where workers search both
when employed and unemployed. The equilibrium wage distribution is
atomless and lies below the marginal product of labor with larger rms
oering higher wages. Firms are indierent between all wages in its
support, since they attract more workers by oering higher wages. A
minimum wage shifts the distribution upward so that there is a spillover
eect. However, like Albrecht and Vroman (1998), it must also remain
atomless, because otherwise a rm would be able to discontinuously
increase its labor supply by a small increase in the wage. Hence this
model does not explain the observed spike in the wage-distribution
induced by minimum wages.
Furthermore, the papers by Albrecht and Vroman (1998) and Bur-
dett and Mortensen (1998) have very strong empirical predictions re-
garding the shape of the wage distribution. In particular, the density
function over equilibrium wages in Albrecht and Vroman (1998) must
be monotonically increasing in the wage rate. In contrast, Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) predicts that the density function should be mono-
tonically decreasing in the wage rate. That is, for identically able work-
ers, the relative frequency of a wage oer is a monotonic function of
the wage|either case seems implausible as a general rule. Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) provide an extension which|like the current paper|
requires employers to be heterogeneous in terms of their productivity.
Once employer productivity dierences are allowed for, non-monotonic
7The literature on employee turnover Salop (1979a) is also related. This is mo-
tivated by the notion that workers are unsure of employer characteristics prior
to employment and only learn about them gradually, however, turnover is deter-
mined exogenously and lacks microfoundations (i.e., worker quit decisions are left
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equilibrium wage distributions can emerge. However, as before, wage
distributions must remain atomless and therefore even with employer
heterogeneity, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is unable to explain the
existence of a spike at the minimum wage.
5. Concluding Remarks
The predictions of our model regarding the distribution of wages
and how they are aected by minimum wages are consistent with the
empirical evidence. In particular, a spike in the wage distribution is a
natural feature in our model but is inconsistent with other models. The
intuition is that preference heterogeneity implies that rms command
\loyalty" among some of their workers. This in turn implies that wage
oers do not need to increase at the same rate as the minimum wage so
that as the minimum wage increases, some rms which previously paid
more than the minimum will oer exactly the minimum wage. Our
basic assumption (of less than perfect homogeneity of jobs) is realistic
and the resulting is model is tractable.
Search and eciency wages are no doubt also important to our un-
derstanding of the functioning of labor markets, however, these models,
which are the most popular explanations for wage dispersion, fail on
what would seem to be a fundamental point. That is, when the market
is perturbed with a binding minimum wage, the resulting wage distri-
bution fails to behave in accordance with the empirical evidence. A
robust theory of wage dispersion would ideally explain not only the
existence of wage dierentials but should also be able to predict how
these equilibrium wage distributions change in response to an impor-
tant and commonly applied policy such as a minimum wage. Under
such a criterion, our theory is highly successful.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Letting Q = B 1, employer i's equilibrium
wage is given by w
i =
Pn 1
k=0 qikk. Since B is a symmetric circu-
lant8 matrix, Q is also a symmetric circulant matrix. Circulant ma-
trices can be dened by their rst row so let q = (q0;q1;:::qn 1) =








qn 1 = 1 (22)
8A square matrix C is circulant if the elements of each row of C are identical
to those of the previous row, but are moved one position to the right and wrapped




qt + qt+1  

2
qt+2 = 0 (23)







qn 2 + qn 1 = 0 (24)




















and since  < 1=2, it follows that 0 <  < 1 < . The general solution




for arbitrary constants A and B. Substituting this into (22) and (24)











1   2: (29)
These are both positive and therefore qt > 0 for all t = 0;:::n   1.
Since Q is symmetric and circulant, it must be the case that qt = qn t
for t = 1;:::[n=2]. Furthermore, since  < 1 and  > 1, if qt is non-
monotonic in t, it must rst be declining and then be rising. But
because Q is symmetric, it must be the case that q0 > q1 > ::: >
q[n=2].
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